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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant, Chester Hollman, appeals from the district 
court's denial of his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 2254, claiming that a violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), undermines his murder 
conviction. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
 
Factual Background 
 
On May 4, 1993, a Common Pleas Court jury in 
Philadelphia convicted Hollman of second-degree murder, 
possession of an instrument of crime, robbery, and criminal 
conspiracy for his involvement in the shooting death of Tae 
Jung Ho, a graduate student at the University of 
Pennsylvania. Ho had been walking with his girlfriend at 
22nd and Sansom Streets in Philadelphia in the early 
morning of August 20, 1991, when the two were 
approached by Hollman and another man, who pushed Ho 
to the ground. Hollman restrained Ho by sitting on his legs 
while the other assailant shot Ho in the chest; he was killed 
instantly. Hollman then robbed Ho and the two men ran 
back to their vehicle, a white Chevy Blazer. 
 
The evidence against Hollman included the testimony of 
Deirdre Jones who had been traveling with Hollman in the 
car that night. She testified that she had been driving 
around Center City with Hollman and two other 
individuals, a man and a woman. The two men stopped the 
car and discussed their plan to rob someone; Jones was 
instructed to act as a "lookout." The two men then left the 
car. Jones heard a gunshot and the two men jumped back 
into the vehicle and sped away. Shortly thereafter, the two 
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other passengers exited the car and Hollman and Jones 
continued driving. 
 
Two other witnesses near the scene testified that they 
heard a gunshot and saw two men jumping into a white 
Chevy Blazer which contained two passengers. One 
witness, a taxi driver, followed the car and was able to read 
the first few letters of the license plate, "YZA" before losing 
the car in traffic. The driver reported what he had seen and 
gave a description of the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, a 
Philadelphia police officer stopped the car driven by 
Hollman within blocks of the crime scene. It matched the 
taxi driver's description and bore a license plate which 
started with the letters "YZA." As the officer questioned and 
searched Hollman he observed that Hollman was perspiring 
heavily and seemed highly agitated. 
 
At trial, the only eyewitness who claimed to have actually 
seen the crime in progress was Andre Dawkins. Dawkins 
was standing outside a convenience store across the street 
from the crime scene. He testified that he saw Hollman and 
another man push Ho to the ground and heard Ho plead 
for his life and the life of his girlfriend. Dawkins claimed to 
have had a good view of Hollman running back to the car 
after the shooting and identified Hollman as the man who 
had restrained Ho while the other assailant shot him. 
 
During his interview with the police, Hollman denied 
everything. However, when confronted with the statement of 
Deirdre Jones, he blurted out, "I told that bitch to keep her 
mouth shut, shit." During a search of Hollman's residence, 
a .38 caliber revolver was discovered. An expert testified at 
trial that the bullet that killed Ho could have come from 
that gun. 
 
The jury convicted Hollman of second degree murder, 
possession of an instrument of crime, robbery, and criminal 
conspiracy. 
 
After the trial, Hollman's counsel learned that, due to an 
apparent clerical error, the prosecution had not had, and 
thus did not provide him with, a full and accurate report of 
Dawkins's criminal history. This error was not detected 
until Dawkins was arrested for robbery several months 
after the Hollman trial. Dawkins had accidently been given 
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two different identification numbers in the police computer 
system. The record retrieved by the government and 
provided to defense counsel contained a recent arrest for 
burglary, a prior arrest under the alias John Johnson, and 
several open bench warrants. However, it did not contain 
significant aspects of Dawkins's criminal history including 
robbery and conspiracy convictions, and a prior conviction 
for filing a false report of incriminating evidence with the 
authorities. 
 
Hollman moved for a new trial in state court arguing, 
inter alia, that the prosecution's failure to turn over this 
impeachment evidence constituted a Brady violation. See 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).1 Hollman 
contended that had the information been available during 
trial, the credibility of Dawkins could have been impeached 
using his prior crimen falsi convictions. The trial court held 
a post-trial hearing on the matter and then denied the 
motion, sentencing Hollman to life in prison. The Superior 
Court rejected the same argument and the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania denied an allowance of appeal. Hollman 
then filed this S 2254 motion in the district court on March 
2, 1997. The district court, adopting the opinion of the 
Magistrate Judge, denied relief finding that the failure to 
produce Dawkins's entire criminal record did not warrant a 
new trial under Brady. As the district court granted a 
certificate of appealability, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 2253(a). We likewise deny Hollman's habeas 
petition. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court's legal 
conclusions made in reviewing a S 2254 petition. See Orban 
v. Vaughn, 123 F.3d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 717 (1998). Because Hollman filed his petition 
before the district court on March 24, 1997, it is governed 
by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act ("AEDPA") which became effective on April 24, 
1996. The AEDPA creates the following standard that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hollman raised other issues in his state court motions but the appeal 
before us focuses on the alleged Brady violation. 
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federal courts must apply when reviewing a habeas petition 
brought by a state prisoner: 
 
       An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
       a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
       State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
       claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
       proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
       Court of the United States, or 
 
       (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
       unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
       evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). The issue raised in Hollman's habeas 
petition was clearly adjudicated on the merits in state 
court. Because the question before us is one of law we 
examine the state court's decision to determine if it was 
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 
clearly established federal law." As we find that the state 
court's decision on Hollman's petition was not deficient 
under this standard, we will deny habeas relief. 
 
We recognize that we have not yet defined the contours 
of the new AEDPA standard. See Berryman v. Morton, 100 
F.3d 1089, 1103 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that "we have not 
determined the extent of the deference that federal habeas 
courts must afford to the legal or the factual determinations 
made by state courts").2 However, we need not do so here, 
because the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not render a 
decision contrary to clearly established federal law under 
any reading of the relevant standard. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Cf. O'Brien v. DuBois, 145 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1998) (setting forth that 
circuit's interpretation of the AEDPA); Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 
(4th Cir. 1998) (same); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(same); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997) (same). 
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State Court's Determination 
 
When the error regarding Dawkins's criminal 
identification numbers was discovered, Hollman moved for 
a new trial on the basis of the claimed Brady violation and 
argued that his counsel had been ineffective in failing to 
produce other evidence to impeach Dawkins. The trial court 
conducted a post-trial hearing. The court determined that 
the failure to produce Dawkins's entire criminal record did 
not constitute a Brady violation and that even if defense 
counsel had known about the earlier convictions, the result 
of the trial would not have been different. The trial court 
thus concluded that a new trial was not warranted. 
Hollman appealed to the Superior Court which determined 
that the mistakenly omitted evidence did not constitute a 
Brady violation, that Hollman was not entitled to a new 
trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence, and that the 
court's charge did not deny Hollman due process.3 The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied an allowance of 
appeal on April 1, 1996. As Hollman has exhausted his 
state court remedies with respect to the issues raised in 
this appeal, we can review his claim brought under S 2254. 
 
Discussion 
 
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that "the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or punishment." 373 U.S. at 87. A 
new trial will be granted for a Brady violation only if the 
defendant can demonstrate both that the prosecution 
withheld exculpatory evidence, and that the evidence was 
material, in that the defendant did not receive a fair trial 
because of its absence. See United States v. Pelullo, 105 
F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1997). It is well established that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Although the Superior Court decision that Brady was not violated 
rested on an erroneous view that impeachment material cannot 
constitute exculpatory evidence under Brady, the particulars of the 
reasoning do not affect our ruling because we hold that, in any event, 
the state court adjudication did not result in a decision that was 
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
federal 
law because we, too, find that Brady is not implicated. 
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impeachment evidence can constitute exculpatory evidence 
under Brady and its progeny and Hollman is correct that 
evidence of a government witness's prior criminal history is 
evidence which must be produced to the defense. See 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972). 
 
The law is clear that the prosecution must not "withhold" 
impeachment evidence. It is equally clear that the 
government is only "obligated to produce certain evidence 
actually or constructively in its possession or accessible to 
it." United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 
1991).4 Where the prosecutor had no actual or constructive 
possession of information, there can be no Brady violation 
for failure to disclose it. It is uncontested that the 
prosecution did not have actual possession of the full 
criminal record of Dawkins. Constructive possession means 
that a prosecutor "should . . . have known that the material 
at issue was in existence." United States v. Joseph, 996 
F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In Perdomo, we found a Brady violation where the 
government failed to provide the defense with a witness's 
criminal history report. 929 F.2d at 971. In that case, 
however, the government's search for available information 
was deficient in that it failed even to request a criminal 
history report from the Virgin Islands. Id. It was the 
government's failure to seek "information readily available 
to it" which prompted the court to find that the first prong 
of Brady had been violated. Id. Thus, we, along with several 
other circuits have imposed upon the prosecution a duty to 
search accessible files to find requested exculpatory 
material. See United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502- 
03 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. By discussing Third Circuit caselaw construing Brady we are not 
concluding that it is necessarily pertinent, let alone controlling, in 
applying the standard under the AEDPA. There are conflicting views 
among the courts of appeals referenced above as to the relevance and 
weight of precedents established by courts other than the Supreme 
Court in applying the AEDPA, and we have yet to explore this issue. 
However, Perdomo is useful to demonstrate that even our court of 
appeals, in applying Brady, has not ventured from the concept that it is 
available and accessible information that must be disclosed. 
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(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 481 
(5th Cir. 1980). As one court has noted, the duty rests on 
the notion that "government failure to turn over an easily 
turned rock is essentially as offensive as one based on 
government non-disclosure." Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503. The 
duty to search discourages the government from 
intentionally keeping itself ignorant of information useful to 
the defense. See Carey, 738 F.2d at 878. However, where 
the government has diligently searched, no Brady violation 
will be found. See United States v. Young, 20 F.3d 758, 764 
(7th Cir. 1994) (declining to find Brady violation where 
government diligently searched national and localfiles for 
information about witness's criminal history but failed to 
search records of other states). 
 
Here we cannot say that the prosecutor should have-- or 
even could have -- known about, or searched for, the 
clerical error which resulted in Andre Dawkins being given 
two different criminal identification numbers. The cause of 
the failure is characterized by the parties as an 
administrative mistake. Without some record evidence that 
it was something more than a mistake, we cannot conclude 
that the government withheld information that was readily 
available to it or constructively in its possession. 
Accordingly, we find that the government did not withhold 
Dawkins's full criminal history and that the failure of the 
government to produce this material does not constitute a 
Brady violation. 
 
We note that Hollman is really arguing that we expand 
the scope of what constitutes Brady material, since he does 
not dwell on the issue of accessibility, but focuses, rather, 
on his view that the defendants' proceeding to trial without 
this type of information simply should constitute a violation 
of Brady. We have little difficulty rejecting this argument as 
it clearly entails extending Brady beyond the scope of any 
federal case precedent. 
 
Even if we were to view the prosecution's failure to 
retrieve Dawkins's complete record as a violation of Brady, 
he would not be entitled to a new trial unless we 
determined that the favorable evidence was "material" in 
that Hollman did not receive a fair trial because of the 
absence of that evidence. See Pelullo, 105 F.3d at 122 
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(citations omitted). A fair trial is one deemed worthy of 
confidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
The defendant must show that "the favorable evidence 
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." 
Id. at 435. The question here is whether Dawkins's crimen 
falsi convictions are material, that is, whether there is a 
reasonable probability that disclosure of his criminal record 
would have led to a different result at trial. Id. at 432-42. 
 
Hollman asserts that the absence of a record of 
Dawkins's prior crimen falsi convictions was material and 
deprived him of a fair trial in three ways. First, Dawkins 
was able to perjure himself with impunity regarding his 
criminal history; second, the government relied on 
Dawkins's credibility in its closing; and third, the jury 
instructions given by the trial judge somehow buttressed 
the credibility of Dawkins's testimony. Like the district 
court, we disagree. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that Dawkins's credibility 
was impeached repeatedly during the trial. The cross- 
examination of Dawkins focused on inconsistencies in his 
statements to the police and in his trial testimony.5 During 
his cross-examination, defense counsel established that 
Dawkins had an extensive history of conflict with law 
enforcement which he blamed on police harassment. The 
jury was made aware of the fact that Dawkins had a 
criminal record.6 In addition, Dawkins admitted that bench 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Dawkins admitted that when questioned by the police he had initially 
denied seeing the murder and lied in his statement to the police because 
he "didn't want to get involved." App. at 1359-62. He also admitted that 
he did not reveal his address to police officers but claimed to be living 
on the streets because he feared he would be considered a "snitch" for 
reporting what he saw. App. at 1337. 
 
6. Defense counsel questioned Dawkins about his most recent burglary 
arrest, about his prior conviction for theft and on his use of an alias in 
connection with that arrest. He denied his involvement in the burglary 
and his use of an alias but admitted, "I have summaries. I have a 
burglary. I ain't been a saint all of my life." App. at 1267. 
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warrants had been issued for him in several "summary 
cases." App. at 1255.7 
 
When Dawkins was questioned about his most recent 
arrest for burglary, he denied that he had committed the 
crime and complained of extensive harassment by the 
police. However, the arresting officer testified that at the 
time of his arrest Dawkins admitted to having committed 
the burglary and that he was able to describe the items 
removed from the apartment. App. at 1557-58. In addition, 
the detective told the jury that Dawkins asked for help in 
dealing with his crack cocaine addiction. App. at 1559. 
During his testimony, Dawkins had stated that he hadn't 
used drugs for years. App. at 1286. 
 
Further, Dawkins admitted at trial that he had a history 
of mental problems. Specifically, Dawkins testified that he 
had spent seven months in a state mental institution 
because he "didn't know who [he] was." App. at 1285. He 
also stated that he was no longer taking his psychiatric 
medication and had not been taking the medication at the 
time he observed Ho's murder. App. at 1286. We conclude 
that the additional impeachment material contained in the 
complete criminal record would have been merely 
cumulative. We find that even had defense counsel been 
provided with Dawkins's crimen falsi convictions, the 
additional impeachment evidence would not have put the 
whole case in such a different light as to undermine our 
confidence in the verdict. 
 
Hollman contends that the harm created by the 
purported Brady violation was exacerbated because 
Dawkins escaped challenge for his perjury on the stand.8 It 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In response to a question about outstanding bench warrants Dawkins 
replied, 
 
       I had summary bench warrants. It's from the case I got a little -- 
it 
       used to haunt me. I used to dream about it so much that I had an 
       attitude constantly, so much of an attitude that if someone said 
       something to me, I would tell them off. They would not leave me 
       alone. They still don't leave me alone. . . . And I told off many a 
       police officer, many a people, and they locked me up. 
 
App. at 1255-56. 
 
8. This perjury consisted of three instances where Dawkins denied 
having a criminal record. App. at 1267; 1268; 1272. 
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is true that Dawkins perjured himself by not revealing that 
he did have a criminal record but this does not give rise to 
separate rights under Brady. Further, we note that had all 
the parties had Dawkins's full criminal history, it is 
unlikely that he would have testified that he had no record. 
Rather, it appears that Dawkins was attempting to benefit 
from the clerical error which seemingly purged a portion of 
his criminal past. 
 
Hollman's contention that the government, in its closing 
argument, relied on the credibility of Dawkins is similarly 
flawed. App. at 1686; 1689-90.9 To the contrary, the 
prosecutor did not place undue reliance on the credibility of 
Dawkins and, seemingly realizing his questionable 
credibility, advised the jury that there was sufficient 
evidence to convict Hollman without the testimony of 
Dawkins. App. at 1679. Finally, Hollman's argument that 
the jury instructions invited the jury to rely on the 
testimony of Dawkins is without merit. The trial judge gave 
standard jury instructions that would have been unaffected 
if Dawkins had been impeached using his crimen falsi 
convictions. 
 
The record as a whole lends further support to the 
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to convict 
Hollman without the testimony of Dawkins. Compelling 
evidence was provided by Deirdre Jones who was traveling 
in the car with Hollman that night. While the trial court 
properly instructed that her testimony was subject to 
scrutiny as a "corrupt and polluted source," her version of 
the events was corroborated by the other witnesses in the 
case. For example, two witnesses heard the shooting, saw 
two men fleeing, and supplied information about the white 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In the two passages cited by Hollman, the prosecutor asked the jury 
to decide if Dawkins was "shaken" on the stand. However, the passages, 
read in their entirety reveal that the prosecutor recognized that his 
witness was flawed. First, the prosecutor stated:"No, I won't apologize 
for Andre Dawkins because there's dignity in everything. I submit to you 
that you saw him on the stand. Was he articulate? Was he shaken on 
cross-examination?" App. at 1686. Later, he asked, "I say to you, in the 
examination of Andre Dawkins, was he shaken? And do you think less 
of Andre Dawkins because of what a detective said that had nothing to 
do with nothing? If so, it's your decision." App. at 1690. 
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vehicle. One was able to note that the license plate started 
with "YZA." Shortly after the crime, and within blocks of the 
crime scene, a police officer stopped Hollman driving a 
vehicle matching this description. The officer testified as to 
Hollman's anxious demeanor upon being searched. Upon 
being informed that Jones had provided a statement, 
Hollman exclaimed, "I told that bitch to keep her mouth 
shut, shit." Finally, the bullet which killed Ho came from a 
.38 caliber gun. A .38 caliber gun was found in Hollman's 
apartment. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court's decision 
that the failure of the government to provide the full 
criminal history of Andre Dawkins did not constitute a 
violation of Hollman's rights under Brady was not a 
decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of federal law. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order of November 25, 1997, denying Hollman's 
petition for habeas corpus. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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